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
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中華民國二十九年十月一日

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
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
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
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SMALL BOOKS
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
PHILOSOPHICAL
THEORIES
AND
PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPERIENCE.

(FROM THE SECOND LONDON EDITION.)

£ PHILADELPHIA:
LEA AND BLANCHARD.
1846.








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SMALL BOOKS ON GREAT SUBJECTS.

EDITED BY A

FEW WELL-WISHERS TO KNOWLEDGE.

No. I.



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PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES


AND

PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE.

BY A PARIAH.

FROM THE SECOND LONDON EDITION.

By Caroline F. E. Spurgeon



PHILADELPHIA:
LEA AND BLANCHARD.
1846.

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1860, Jan. 31.

Gift of
Rev. James Walker, D.D.
of Cambridge =
(No. 26. 1814.)

PHILADELPHIA:
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PRINTERS.

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION.

WHEN the Pariah first published his lucubrations to the world, he scarcely expected that they would meet with so favorable a reception as to call for a second edition: in this, it appears, he had deceived himself; and he now sends his "small book" to the press a second time, with the gratified feeling that he has not labored altogether in vain. He does not, in the guise of writers on lesser subjects, return thanks to the public for its liberal patronage, for profit and fame were no part of his object; but he rejoices in the thought that he may perhaps have contributed somewhat towards the advance of that kingdom of Christ on earth, which has hitherto been the object of our wishes rather than our expectations.

The success of his small work seems to indicate that many are beginning to feel the want of something which should teach them, not only the Christian faith,—for of such there are abundance,—but its rational grounds; something which by showing how deeply it is rooted in, and entwined with everything about and within us, may prove that the Framers of the world and its Lawgiver are the same; and thus lead them to the cross of the Redeemer, with the full conviction that the lesson to be learned there is no "cunningly devised fable," but that in truth "the wisdom of God" no less than "the power of God" was there manifested to the world.

This was the object which the writer proposed to himself when he first attempted to put into a porta-

ble form the result of many years' thought, and experience gained through suffering. Faith, without rational conviction, is but like the seed which fell in dry places; it withers when the hour of trial comes; for it has not rooted itself deeply enough in the mind to draw thence wholesome nourishment; and hence perhaps arises much of that "falling away" as it is technically termed, which occasionally scandalizes the world among professing Christians. The man, on the contrary, who has cleared and worked the soil beforehand, for the reception of the seed sown by the Divine Husbandman, is at least in a fair way of seeing it bear good fruit.

To handle the spade, and root up weeds, is a toil permitted, and indeed appropriated to the lowest caste in society, though to turn up the ground to make it ready for the heavenly seed, be a task which angels might be proud of. Humbly, and yet boldly, therefore, as becomes one of a despised and oppressed caste on a noble mission, he has addressed himself to his work; and, like a wiser and better man,* has bent his knee to the Throne of all grace, and asked for a blessing on his attempt. If any success has attended his endeavors, he feels that it is to the sanctifying effect of such a prayer on his own mind that he owes it: may the reader, like the writer, gain, while turning up the soil, the treasure of a firm faith in Him who is THE TRUTH AND THE LIFE, and who is always found by those who seek Him.

And with this heartfelt good wish, kind reader, the writer takes his leave of thee for the present.

November 10, 1844.

* Joseph Mede.

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES.

THERE was a time when none dared profane the name of philosophy by its mention, whose lips had not been touched with hallowed flame by Alma Mater, and who had not dozens of honorary letters following his name, like the tail of a Highland chieftain in olden days: but that time is past: men have at last discovered that the conferring a degree does not always confer sense, and that among the undignified names which go with neither a footman behind, nor a coachman before them, there may be found some who have a nobility of their own; and who, amid disadvantages and difficulties, have contrived to assert their right to the peerage of Intellect:

The writer of this work, as the title-page shows, is below even this; he is a Pariah, of a despised caste; unthought of even when the ten pounds householders of Stroud or Tamworth have the honor of hearing speeches from, and asking questions of, the great men who in this country are seized with a periodical fit of humility about once in four or five years. He has no pretensions to academical honors, lectures to no institution, is no hereditary legislator, no limb of representative wisdom: but he has known poverty, sickness, and sorrow; he has bent over the graves of those he loved, and turned again to life to struggle for his own existence, and in this rude school he has learned a lesson which, perhaps, may be not unuseful to his fellow-creatures; he has learned that happiness may be attained under circumstances which seem to forbid it; wrongs borne

patiently without losing dignity ; privations endured with a gay heart. The philosophy which has done this has made its last and best step,—it has become *practical*. It is no longer the barren speculation of the metaphysician, or the idle logic of the schools, but healthy intellectual science, grounded on the great facts of human nature, and available in all the circumstances of our varied existence.

There was a time too,—how much of late has sunk in the troubled ocean of human affairs even in the space of one not very long life !—there was a time when intellectual science under the name of metaphysics, was the mark for every witling to try his young jests on, sure of a favorable reception from the great body of his hearers. It is one of the singular facts of our social state, that there are always some few things which no one who pretends to enter good society ought to know ; and if all these *pet* ignorances had had their tombstones erected, and epitaphs duly written by their admirers, it would be hard to conceive a more amusing, though in truth melancholy record of human folly. In the days of Addison, no well-bred lady would venture to know how to spell ; in later times the prohibition only extended to any cultivation of the intellectual powers, which for a long time was most religiously attended to by all the fair votaries of fashion. In the days of Fielding, it would seem that a very pretty gentleman indeed, might gain a grace by misquoting Latin sufficiently to show that he despised the dull routine of school education. Later yet, a mineralogist or a botanist walked a few inches higher, if he could avow himself ignorant of metaphysics, and make some clever jest on the cobweb speculations of its admirers ; and all, learned or ignorant, wise or foolish, still unite in thinking it the properest thing in

the world to be totally ignorant of the properties of drugs, or their effect on the human body. True it is that a healthy mind in a healthy body is a thing worth having; a few deny that: and intellectual and medical science may do somewhat towards the preservation of both; this is also allowed: but to attempt to *know* anything about the matter is really too fatiguing for polished people, who can afford to pay tutors and physicians. But the writer is a Pariah, and having said thus much, he need hardly assure his readers, if any of that so-named "gentle" race ever take up these pages, that he never was great, or fashionable, or scientific enough, to have a pet of this kind: it would have been a troublesome, sometimes an expensive, always a disagreeable companion, a great hindrance to all rational employment, and no help to one who not unfrequently has found his wits his best heritage.

If such an one cannot afford to keep a pet ignorance, so neither can he afford to carry on abstract speculations which lead to no practical result: corporeal wants must be attended to; the difficulties of this life must be met and vanquished; and if in the midst of the struggles requisite to avoid being trodden under foot in the crowd, those great questions, which sooner or later occur to every reasonable mind, present themselves, it is not as curious contemplations, matters of philosophical research merely, which may occupy a portion of the time which is gliding away in the lap of ease and luxury, but as problems whose solution involves everything worth caring for in time or in eternity; problems whose due solution may gild a life which has no other gilding, may set fortune at defiance, direct our steps in difficulties, and like oil upon the waves, spread calm where all was turmoil and danger before: it is then

that intellectual science loses its character of barren speculation ; every step in advance raises us farther above the mists of earth ; and the heart warms, and the limbs grow strong, at seeing the prospect brightening in the distance, under the unclouded beams of truth and love.

It seems, nevertheless, to be necessary that science, as well as man, should pass through its different stages of growth ; at first, theoretic and fanciful, then abstruse, and finally, vigorous and practical. Astronomy has so proceeded ; many a small wit jested at the idle "star-gazing" of Flamsted and Halley as satisfactorily as the same genus has scoffed from age to age at the "unintelligible" reveries of Socrates, or any other seeker of the truth, from Pythagoras down to Dugald Stewart and Theodore Jouffroy ; but no small wit *now* tries to ground his fame on a successful scoff at "star-gazers ;" even Butler's "Elephant in the Moon" has followed the fate of the jests of lesser men, it is neither quoted, nor perhaps by the generality of the world remembered ; and the science which guides the mariner over an untracked ocean with all the assurance of a mapped country, sits enthroned in the affections no less than the respect of the present generation. It is time that metaphysical, or, as I would rather term it, intellectual science,* should take a like place, for it has

* " Taken in its largest comprehension, as the knowledge of abstract and separate substances, Aristotle raises the philosophy of mind *above* all other parts of learning. He assigns to it the investigation of the principles and causes of things in general, and ranks it not only as superior, but also as prior in the order of Nature, to the whole of Arts and Sciences. But ' what is first to Nature is not first to Man. Nature begins with causes, which produce effects. Man begins with effects, and by them ascends to causes. Thus all human study and investigation proceed of necessity in the reverse of the natural order of things ; from

in its power to do a greater work than this: it can map the gulph between earth and heaven, and teach man, amid the conflicting opinions of the pilots who undertake to steer his bark, to choose and follow the straight course which will lead him over that untracked ocean in safety. The great men whose lives were spent in the pursuit of abstract truth, have left the results of their labors to us, and as the fanciful dreams of proportion in numbers, pushed at last to the exactness of mathematical science, have given us practical astronomy, so it is for us now to avail ourselves of the severe truth to which they have reduced the more imaginative Greek philosophy, and draw from it practical metaphysic.

Had any one else appeared inclined to undertake the task, the writer would willingly have left it in the hands of the learned and the illustrious in science; but no such attempt seems likely to be made, and as there are but too many of the Pariah race, who, like himself, may find that something more than the trite instruction of the school-room, or even the pul-

sensible to intelligible, from body, the effect, to mind, which is both the first and final cause. Now physica being the name given by the Peripatetic to the philosophy of body, from this necessary course of human studies, some of his interpreters called that of mind, Metaphysic *τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, implying also by the term, that its subject being more sublime and difficult than any other, as relating to universals, the study of it would come most properly and successfully after that of physics. Taking it, however, in its natural order, as furnishing the general principles of all other parts of learning which descend from thence to the cultivation of particular subjects, Aristotle himself called this the First Philosophy; but as its subject is universal being, particularly mind, which is the highest and most universal, he gave it also the appellation of the Universal Science, common to all the rest; and lastly, to finish his encomium of this First and Universal philosophy, he honored it with the exclusive name of 'Wisdom.'—*Tatham's Chart and Scale of Truth*, vol. i. p. 17. .

pit, is wanting to brace the mind to resist the rude buffets of the world, he at length steps forward, not as thinking himself wise, but as feeling himself experienced :—

—————“ *Nec nos via fallit euntes :
Vidimus obscuris primam sub vallibus urbem
Venatu assiduo, et totum cognovimus amnem.*”

INTRODUCTORY INQUIRIES.

THERE are some few important questions which have been constantly agitated from the earliest period that we have any record of man's history. The answers attempted have been various ; but none, as yet, have been so generally satisfactory as to prevent them from being agitated afresh by every new generation, for to every new generation they present themselves with a never-fading interest.

Man goes forth at his entrance into life, confident in powers which, to his youthful fancy, seem to know no limit ; he feels the happiness that his nature is capable of, and that it sighs for, and he rushes on to grasp and to enjoy it ; but he soon perceives that a power, exterior to himself, limits, and often thwarts his endeavors ; he finds himself at the mercy of circumstances which he can rarely guide, or at best only in a very slight degree ; and amid the anguish of disappointed hope he asks himself, "What is this power which I can neither control nor escape from ?"

But he is young ; he has probably expected to find his happiness in the pleasures of the senses ; and a voice within him says that these are gross, and unworthy of the god-like nature which he is conscious of possessing. He launches into the pursuits of the man ; forces himself to acquire science and greatness at the expense of exertions which exhaust his physical strength ; and then, when almost sinking under the fatigue of labors which, nevertheless, have not given him all that he sought, he asks himself again,

"What is this restless power within, which despises corporeal enjoyment, and triumphs in compelling the sacrifice of bodily comfort for an object which, after all, none attain?"

Insurmountable obstacles limit his progress; the perverseness of men thwarts his views for their benefit no less than his own; he looks round him in querulous displeasure, and again exclaims, "Why is evil in the world?" But old age now approaches, "his thoughts" must "perish" ere he has accomplished half that he has proposed to himself; he must "go hence and be no more seen," before he has even attained the fruit of his labors; he seems to have "walked in a vain shadow, and disquieted himself in vain;" and then, when all that has filled his great aspirations seems shrinking from his grasp, when all appears "vanity and vexation of spirit," he once more asks in a sort of concentrated despair, "Why man proposes ends to himself which he can never compass? What is the good which his nature demands, and how is it to be obtained? Is it sensual enjoyment? No! such pleasures pall on the senses, and end in disgust. Is it intellectual? The limited powers of men make the pursuit of science laborious, and death comes ere he has reached what he sought. Is it in the innocent enjoyments of social life? These are soon buried in the graves of those he loves.

These are the questions which every man not wholly brutalized must sooner or later ask himself. These are the questions, in fact, which have agitated mankind in all ages, and whose solution forms the basis of all systems of religion and philosophy. They all may be resolved into three; namely,

1. What is the nature of the power exterior to ourselves?

2. What is the nature of the power within ourselves?

3. What, with reference to these two, is the nature of the good which man ought to propose to himself as his aim and object?

The solution of the first two questions forms the subject of all metaphysical, or in other words, intellectual science. That of the third gives the practical result. Systems of religion decide these questions authoritatively, systems of philosophy solve them by rational argument, and as, however numerous these systems may be, there can be but ONE TRUTH, so we are justified in assuming that the religious and the philosophical system must tally, or that one or the other is in error. There is, however, this difference between the two, viz., that the authoritative system is necessarily delivered in the form of dogmata to be received, not of arguments to be tried and weighed; and these dogmata are couched in words which, as no previous course of reasoning is recorded, are liable to be misinterpreted by the prejudices of mankind. The philosophical system, on the contrary, is obliged to prove its assertions step by step; and if an undue leaning to any preconceived notion should lead to the adoption of a weak argument, the first dispassionate man who goes over the same ground will perceive and overthrow it: thus, though in the case of sufficiency of external evidence to prove the pretensions of the first to be well grounded, it is the shorter process, and therefore most acceptable to man's indolence; yet the second is the more certain one. To be completely satisfactory, the two should be joined together; but though occasionally a voice has been raised to call for this auspicious union, unfortunately for the world, the guardians of the former have gene-

rally held her to be too rich a bride to be bestowed on a mate who had no better inheritance than Socrates' old cloak and worn sandals, and have "forbidden the banns." The consequences have been disastrous: philosophy, like a wild youth, has run through a course of licentiousness; and religion, like a wealthy heiress, has become the prey of designing men. It is, perhaps, not too late to rescue both. Let us then begin with philosophy, whose morals—whatever they might have been while he was Socrates' pupil—have in later times been thought by no means faultless.

It would be a long, and, to a reader—a wearisome task, to go over all the disputes which have agitated the learned through so many centuries, as to moral perceptions, innate ideas, &c. He who would map a country must explore the by-roads; but he who uses the map, if he finds the road laid down lead to the place he wishes to arrive at, will not think it needful to traverse every lane on his way. It will suffice, therefore, to assume as an axiom,—what nobody, probably, will deny,—that truth is reality, namely, what really *is*; error an unfounded persuasion of something that is not. Now what *is*, must be either within or exterior to ourselves; and to know what is exterior to ourselves truly, that is, in its reality, we must examine it by the evidence of our senses, or by that of our reasoning faculties, or by both conjointly. There is no other process by which we can arrive at a certainty of knowledge. Thus, then, as an innate idea is one which must be received in the mind as truth without previous evidence, an innate idea of what is exterior to ourselves is a contradiction, and the common voice of mankind has decided on the point, by characterizing those who receive the per-

suasions of the imagination in the room of evidence as insane. Nor is the impressing itself on the mind without previous evidence the only necessary character of an innate idea; it must also be found in the minds of all mankind as a constituent part of their nature, otherwise it cannot be innate. It will soon be seen that there is only one idea which can answer to this description, namely, that of individuality, whose demonstration rests on that very individual consciousness, an evidence so unhesitatingly allowed by all mankind, that were any one to attempt to overthrow it by arguing that assertion is no proof, he might make good his position, and yet convince no one: for all feel that in order to assert individual existence it is requisite that a man should exist. But all impressions received by this individual consciousness are exterior to it, and consequently require to be examined; and thus intellectual science, like all others, becomes the subject of experiment and inquiry, and can only make progress by being classified and arranged so as to enable different individuals and succeeding generations to pursue and record their observations upon different portions of it. Even that part which Bacon himself hesitated to subject to the rules of his experimental philosophy, namely, religious knowledge, must submit to the same sort of examination: for from whatever quarter the authoritative dogma comes, it is presented to the senses from without, and cannot be received as authority, without sufficient evidence, both external and internal, to satisfy the mind of its truth; and as in classifying, the most natural arrangement is always the most intelligible, so the great questions which man's experience in life never fails to suggest to him, afford

at once the simplest and the best division of the subject.

I. What is the nature of the power exterior to ourselves ?

Man's first step, when this inquiry has suggested itself to his mind, is to look round on the objects amid which he moves, and which often appear to be the active agents in causing him either enjoyment or suffering. Does the power which controls him exist there ? The untaught savage perhaps answers, yes, and selects his fetiche from the first thing that strikes his fancy. A little more cultivation sends him from the fetiche to something less tangible, and of greater apparent energy, and the heavenly bodies are adored ; but when the question occurs in an age of more advancement, a very different process must be resorted to, in order to satisfy a mind accustomed to the severity of demonstration required by real science. We perceive an universe whose slightest movement we are unable to regulate ; after ages of thought and observation, we think it our glory that we have arrived at the discovery of the laws by which it coheres ; but they are so totally beyond our power to alter, that we can only hope to effect our purpose by shaping it in conformity to them. We have subjected these laws to the strictest examination ; we cannot doubt that we have arrived at the truth, but these immutable laws provide only for the regular movement of inert matter. We look round again ; we are surrounded by organized bodies, and we have not yet discovered the law by which they exist. We converse with our fellows, and find something beyond organized life merely ; we find intellect, that subtle agent by which our inquiries are carried on, itself offering a problem of no small difficulty. The con-

clusion from all this,—ascending by a legitimate process of induction, from what we see and hear to what we cannot discern by any of our external senses, and can only apprehend by means of our reasoning faculties,—is, that some power must exist capable of giving birth to all this ; and as “*ex nihilo nihil fit*,” had there ever been a time when there was nothing, there never could have been a beginning of existence, therefore that power must be eternal ; and as there is nothing but inorganized matter that bears a character of permanency, and the notion of an eternal series is an absurdity ; so to produce organized and intelligent beings, that eternal power must be intelligent. How much superior the creating intelligence must be to that created, the man who has constructed a steam-engine may guess ; for he knows at what an inconceivable distance in the scale of being he stands from the machine he has put together.

The power exterior to ourselves, then, is eternal and intelligent, and what is eternal, is of necessity self-existent. Now it is a necessary consequence of self-existence that such a being must be unlimited both in power and knowledge ; for as he himself exists by his own will, therefore his own nature, no less than all other natures existing by his will, must be perfectly known to him, and entirely under his control, and what is unlimited must be One ; for to suppose a second eternal principle would be to suppose a second individual will and purpose, which must produce a constant warfare, and would derange all the operations of nature, whose laws, on the contrary, we find to be immutable. For an incorporeal being can have no individuality but in will and purpose, and if the will be one, then there is an amalgamation of nature. Thus by a legitimate course of reasoning, we arrive at the certainty of one eternal,

self-existent, all-wise, and all-powerful Being, whom our simple ancestors, with a degree of philosophical accuracy which no other nation seems to have reached, named γοδ, *i. e.* good, for to such a being alone could the perfection belong which justly deserves that appellation.

But we have not even yet exhausted the consequences of this chain of reasoning; for the all-wise and all-powerful Being must be able to effect his will, whatever it may be. We may again look round us, and judge from what we see, what that will is. We see a profusion of means to convey pleasure; a profusion of creatures seemingly made to enjoy it, especially among the lower grades of organized beings. We have already proved that the eternal Intelligence can effect his will, whatever it be; then if that will were malevolent, we should see and feel nothing but destruction and misery; but we do not see it; then that will is not malevolent.

But the sad questioner who began the inquiry as to the nature of this eternal power, may perhaps again inquire, "If the will of the Creator be benevolent, why am I controlled in my wishes, limited to a life which is too short for my projects, and often made miserable during that short life by sickness or by the loss of what I had centred my whole joy in?" But who has assured you that these few years elapsing between the cradle and the tomb are all? The will of the eternal Being is not malevolent, beings of a far lower grade fulfil the end of their being and are happy; you aspire to something which the short span of life never gives. Is it not a proof that your nature is not bounded by that span? Turn then to the next question, for it is now time to do so.

II. What is the nature of the power within ourselves?

Our only way of investigating an intangible and invisible power is by its effects; we can, therefore, only judge of what the power within ourselves is, by noting the phenomena of human nature; these on a little consideration, will be found to resolve themselves into three classes.

1. The instinctive emotions and appetites, all arising involuntarily, attended with a sensible bodily effect, and causing derangement of bodily health when in excess; anger, fear, &c., all take their place among these.

2. The faculties; which are exercised by choice, but suffer fatigue in the exercise, require rest, and exhibit other symptoms of their animal origin, but nevertheless slumber, if not called into activity by a voluntary act.

3. The acts of a restless undivided will, which requires no repose, suffers no fatigue; is as strong in the child or the dotard, as in the mature man; which claims for itself the whole individuality of existence, and speaks of *my* body, *my* faculties, but never seems to have the most distant conception that this body or these faculties are identical with itself.

It is quite clear that neither of the two first classes of phenomena can be referred to that power within whose nature we are seeking to ascertain, for this often curbs and contradicts the instinctive emotions, and impels the faculties to continued exertion, when weariness, and pain even, show how much they need repose. Animal nature does not seek to destroy itself knowingly, but man knows that his life is the forfeit of a particular course of action, and yet he pursues it: then the impelling power is of a different nature from the powers which it impels. It is this impelling individual will, then, or "personal power,"

(as it has been aptly termed by a philosopher* whose works deserve to be more known than they are,) that must form the subject of our inquiry; for on its real nature depends the answer to the last question, as to what the good is which man has to seek, and what are the means to obtain that good.

The first indication of this power is seen in the infant angry at its own helplessness, and evincing its discontent by passionate struggles and cries. The individual will has come into a scene which it does not understand, has organs which are insufficient for its desires, and in mere wayward spite, beats the nurse for not comprehending what is the matter. Watch the growing child; questions, curious observations, obstinate persistence in its own views, show a power which is rather seeking information for its own guidance, than by any means partaking in the immaturity of the childish bodily form. Stronger beings have a will also, which they enforce by the infliction of punishment; the child resists till pain teaches him to choose the lesser evil, and the point is yielded just when pain or privation has reached the point of being more irksome than the concession demanded; † this concession very generally being not

* Theodore Jouffroy. "Mélanges Philosophiques—Des facultés de l'âme humaine."

† It may be objected by some, that the higher animals exhibit some traces of this independent will; but before this objection be allowed weight, it ought to be considered that there is an animal will, the result of mere organization; the impulse of sensation mechanically propagated through the nerves and brain, until the nerves of voluntary motion in their turn receive and propagate the excitement to the muscles; which is, in fact, the whole mystery of instinct. It will be difficult to show that in animals anything more than this instinctive will is ever discovered, but even supposing there were, let the argument have its weight; it might go to prove, perhaps, that the occasional sufferings of the animal creation are parts of a system not yet

the sacrifice of any instinctive desire, but some endeavor at independence in a thing which is itself of little consequence. The child arrives at maturity, and a fresh struggle for freedom commences. Life is thrown away as mere dust, to cast off slavery or preserve free institutions, for man has discovered practically that his nature only arrives at its highest point in a state of rational independence. Old age and sickness supervene; does this restless power, then, yield to circumstances? No. Impatience at the failure of the organs which have been wont to do its bidding, is the usual concomitant of these, and if we do not find impatience, it is only because it is curbed by the knowledge which the imperious spirit has at last gained, that this worn and enfeebled body is not its home, and that brighter days are approaching. When Maskelyne, amid the wreck caused by old age and palsy, blessed the child that sought him with affection, and could only utter "great man once,"—was the personal power less strong? Those few words showed what he would again have done, had he but had the organs requisite for the work. In sleep even, this voluntary power slumbers not; it resigns the reins, indeed, for a time, on the repeated petition of eyes, limbs, and brain, all declaring that they can do no more; but it remains on the watch

fully developed, but it alters not the case as regards man, for we cannot argue from unknown premises; and before we can draw any deduction from animal nature to apply to our own, we must know much more about it than we do. The pride of man has disclaimed the fellowship of the animal creation, but we should be puzzled to find any sufficient proof one way or the other; let us then be contented to leave this matter where we found it, and argue only from what we know, satisfied that man will suffer no deterioration, even if

"in that distant sky
His faithful dog should bear him company."

to use whip and spur again the moment it finds its servants capable of action. If any one doubt this, let him only strongly resolve, at going to sleep, to wake at a particular hour or a particular sound; and without any other known cause than the will, behold the man wakes, though, in any other case, he would have slept to a much later hour, or continued asleep through much louder sounds. This is a thing of too common occurrence to require particular instances to be given. Finally, in death itself, the last symptom of life that we see, is usually an ineffectual effort to do or say something which the dying person evidently thinks of importance; disappointment at being unable to do it, is visible, and the man dies.

We have traced the body from helplessness to death; it varies in its powers: first some instincts prevail, then others; then the faculties are developed, and then they fail. We can easily conceive that this waxing and waning power may return to its elements and be recomposed in a fresh form: but the unchanged individuality, which neither grows nor decays, how is this to perish? What seeds of mortality can we find in that? The anatomist traces nerves of sensation, influencing in their turn the nerves of voluntary action, and shows a beautiful arrangement thus made for the preservation of the animal; but the individual power steps in, says to sensation, "You may stimulate the nerves of voluntary action, but I forbid it;" and to the nerves of voluntary action, "You shall not wait for the stimulus of sensation; I command, and you shall do my bidding." In what part of bodily organization then is this power seated? The philosophical seeker of the truth must answer. It is not a part of bodily organization: it shares not in the growth or decay of the body; then by analogy, neither does it share

in its death;* it sighs for other joys, despises what the body offers, spurns at the limited span of life. What is this but an indication of its destiny? Happiness consists in the full development of all the powers of Nature: no animal seeks that which it is unable to enjoy—the fish remains quiet in the water without seeking to quit it to share the pleasures of the quadruped or the fowl. Man sighs for the felicity of the deity; then man is of a kindred nature. We proceed therefore to the final question.

III. What, with reference to the two powers already treated of, is the nature of the good which man ought to propose to himself as his aim and object?

Our inquiry here will not be long. Whatever other orders of intelligent beings there may be, there are only two that we can form any judgment of:—The One, the subject of our first, the other that of our second question. We assume it as an axiom in philosophy that the felicity of the being must consist in the full development of its natural powers,

* In proportion as science advances, the great truths of Christianity stand forth in a clearer light. In former times the life and the soul were considered as identical, and many a puzzling question arose out of this mistake. Now, physiology has shown that the vital power, inscrutable as its nature has hitherto been found, is nevertheless the same in the animal and the vegetable; consequently that life is not dependent on the soul, but is a perfectly distinct force, acting by its own peculiar laws. But though the soul and the life be different, still the former is an acting force which the physiologist is obliged to acknowledge; for it not unfrequently contends with the vital force, and occasions much disturbance in the system. One of the most distinguished scientific writers of the present age, when treating of organism, distinctly reckons this disturbing force among the different independent causes of the phenomena of man's being. Thus it is that science and religion, the two great inscriptions on God's fabric of creation, always tell the same tale, though it be written in different characters.

and we see this to be the case with all the inferior grades of animals; we turn to man, and we see that the development of his *animal* powers does not satisfy him, he asks for more; he asks for knowledge, greatness, immortality, and these are the felicities of the Deity; then, the good which he has to seek can be none other than the development of an intelligent, and not an animal nature. We have already seen that the individuality is concentrated in that interior power whose nature we have been examining; that interior power is akin to the Deity: then the felicity of the Deity in kind, though not in degree, may be his, and no rational man will propose to himself any other.

Such are the conclusions of philosophy, such were its conclusions from the time when these questions were first agitated, and wise and good men, long before our era, had suffered exile, imprisonment and death, rather than abstain from promulgating these great truths. Who now will dare to stand forward and say that there is any "just cause or impediment" why philosophy and Christianity should not plight their troth to each other, and bless the world henceforward by their holy union? Once more, "I publish the banns," and defy man to put asunder those whom God has willed should be joined together. "Fecisti nos tibi et manet cor irrequietum donec restat in te,"* was the sentiment of Augustine, "Ex vita ita discedo tanquam ex hospitio non tanquam ex domo," says Cicero in the character of Cato, "O præclarum diem cum ad illum divinum animorum concilium, cætumque proficiscar; cum-

* "Thou hast made us for thyself, and the heart is unquiet till it rests in Thee."

que ex hac turbâ et colluvione discedam!"* Where is the difference between the philosopher and the Christian?

I have now gone over the general outline of the classification which I propose to make of intellectual science. I have, I think, proved in answer to the first question that there exists an eternal self-existent, creating Intelligence; all-wise, all-powerful, and benevolent; and the portion of intellectual science which treats of this Being I propose to call *Theology*.†

I have, I think, proved in answer to the second question, that the individuality of man consists in a restless, undying intelligence, akin in its nature to that of the Deity; and I propose to call the portion of intellectual science which relates to the functions of this intelligent, individual power, *Psychology*.

I have drawn as a conclusion in answer to the third question, That such being the nature of that individual power, the good it has to seek is, assimi-

* "O what a delightful day will it be when I shall join that company of divine souls—when I shall quit this throng and this mire!"

† The term *Theology* has been so long applied to a peculiar department of literature that the meaning of the word is in great measure forgotten. I reclaim for it the original sense; for as *Conchology* means the science which tells of the nature of shells, or *Geology* that which tells of the nature of the earth, so *Theology* in strictness means the science which tells of the nature of God; and it is misapplied when used to classify works which mix up the moral duties and the prospects of man, with the abstract science of the Divine Essence. The word would be novel, but it would aid us to define the limits and objects of the science much better, if we were to include all that relates to the mission of Christ to man, and the obligations therefrom resulting, under the general term *Christology*.

lation to the Deity in will and kind of felicity. The titles given to this part of the science have been various. Some have called it *Morality*, some *Religion*; but as unfortunately these two terms have been set up as rivals to each other, neither conveys the exact meaning to men's minds which I would wish. It would be easy to coin another Greek compound, and *Agathology* would not ill express that part of the science which relates to the nature of this "summum bonum" and the means of attaining it; but for a plain man a plain word is better, and I would rather head the last division as the practical result of the two former. In what I have to say further, I shall consider these divisions as applicable no less to the authoritative, than the philosophic system. The external evidence of the former I take for granted; Christianity must have had an origin, and it is far less outrage to common sense to suppose its outset was such as its first promulgators assert, than to allegorize Christ and his apostles into the sun and the signs of the zodiac, or anything else as strange and as improbable. The existence of Christianity is too notorious to be denied; and if, as a system, it offers all that man's best reason has been able to discover, if it offer as a perfect whole, comprehensible to the meanest capacity, what no single man, however great, quite accomplished, then it is no imposture, it is **THE TRUTH**; that truth which Socrates died for, and which armed Cicero's timid nature to meet his assassins with the courage of a hero. It is in vain that we attempt to reject it; the man who professes to cast aside Revelation altogether, still, if he be not a vicious man, lives as a Christian, has a Christian's benevolence; a Christian's hopes; it is in his nature; his instincts oblige him to love his fellows; his faculties compel him to

acknowledge a First Cause; his dearest wish is immortality: Christianity comes but to second the dictates of his better self, and to give a sanction to his hopes; but with this advantage, that he whose mind has not been enough cultivated to reason out a foundation for these hopes, or to argue man's duties from his nature, finds plain precepts for his guidance which embody all and somewhat more than philosophy could have taught him:—if this system be not divine, at any rate had the Deity given a revelation to man, he could have given no other.

It will be my endeavor not to show how the one truth which forms the centre of both the authoritative and philosophical systems will be reflected back from each in turn, so as to throw light upon the other; and if, in so doing, I may set at rest some few of the angry feelings which are too apt to prevail on subjects where they are the most misplaced, if but one heart should learn to feel with me that where all are eagerly looking for the truth, that circumstance ought to make us rather friends than enemies, and that the path we take matters far less than the place we are going too;—I shall have at least one cheering thought to go with me to my grave, brightening my path as all else grows darker.

THEOLOGY.

ONE of the most fruitful sources of angry discussions on this subject on the one hand, and idle scoffs on the other, has been the disposition so prevalent among men, to a species of Anthropomorphism in their notions of the Deity; for though all will not go the length of the Egyptian monks who nearly murdered their bishop for endeavoring to persuade them that God had not actual hands and feet,—as they alleged they found written in the Scripture,—yet many would go nearly that length with him who should dare to assert that God has no more of the vindictive passions than of the bodily form of a man. Yet we must see clearly that one is nearly as absurd a fancy as the other, if we consider that a pure spiritual existence has no individuality but in will, and purpose, and feeling; and that therefore any of those changes in mood which are in truth a part of the *animal* nature of man would be equivalent to a change of individuality in the Deity; for a change of purpose is a change of person, where there is no animal nature to create or suffer that change. Philosophy asserts this, so does Christianity; in God “is no variableness, neither shadow of turning,” yet men in all ages have misapprehended a few eastern hyperboles in the language of the Scripture, till they have made a Deity for themselves such as we should not select, even for a human friend. “I defy you to say so hard a thing of the devil,” said John Wesley, when speaking of Whitfield’s doctrine of Reprobation; yet

Wesley was not free from the prevailing anthropomorphism himself.

The very first step, then, if we would wish either to understand what is predicated of the Deity in our Scriptures, or to know how we ourselves stand with regard to this exterior power, whose will evidently must control us something in the same way that the parent controls the child, is, to ascertain what are the necessary conditions of eternity and self-existence, for it is in vain to say that the Deity is utterly beyond the reach of our reasoning faculties. We can conceive eternity, we can conceive self-existence; every strong and cultivated mind that has turned its attention to these subjects knows this; though it is one of those parts of individual consciousness which admits no other proof than the feeling that we can. We can conceive,—that is, though unable to comprehend, (using the word in its sense of the entire grasping of a subject,) we can apprehend, or reach to and lay hold on, the great features of the case:—we can arrive in thought at an approximation to the nature of an immaterial existence, though we cannot fathom all its depths; and that we can do so is perhaps one of the strongest, though least conspicuous proofs that we have a sort of imperfect specimen within us of what immaterial existence is; for experience shows that man is unable to conceive what he has no exemplar of. The wildest imagination, while endeavoring to form a monster, has never done more than take disjointed parts of known things, and put them together. The essence of eternity and of self-existence is, that it is boundless, for, as I have already observed, if we suppose any other like power, we must either suppose a difference, or an agreement of individual will and purpose; if a difference, then

there must be discord and destruction : if agreement, then, as there are no bodily parts to prevent entire union, there is an amalgamation, and the power is one ; one, in its individuality, that is,—but—as some ancient Christian philosophers have well observed,—not necessarily one in its parts or functions, since the individuality, the wisdom,* and the actively exerted will, are distinct principles appertaining to the same essence : for it is clear that the individuality might exist for ever without any active exertion, yet the power of exertion is in it, and capable of being manifested at any time ; and though the individuality, the wisdom, and the exerted will, are distinct parts or functions of the one self-existent Being, they are necessary consequences of each other, and being each perfect, can be susceptible of no change ; for the knowledge which directs the will being entire, the choice consequent upon it must be always the same ; nor can there be any other essential part or function affirmed of the eternal self-existent Being than these three : all the rest must be mere negatives consequent on them. Thus God cannot be mistaken in the means to an end, or find his purpose changed by unexpected circumstances ; because perfect knowledge forbids both. Nor can God suffer pain or grief, because either the one or the other results from the action of some force, exterior and superior to the being so suffering ; a thing which perfect power equally forbids.

Again, there can be no distinction of past or future with the Deity. Man measures time by the revolu-

* The mere English reader is not aware, and even some scholars scarcely consider that the term λογος, which in the Gospel of St. John is translated "Word," has the meaning in the Greek of the "Reasoning Power," or "Wisdom in active operation."

tions of the earth, and by his own waxing and waning powers. Give him an eternal day and an unaltered body, what then will be his past and future? The past is what he has done and knows, the future what he has not yet done, and therefore does not know: but the Deity knows all, where then is his distinction of time? To him it is one unbounded present, and all the events of the world, no less than its component parts, lie spread before him as in a map; save that our map only represents material objects, whereas it is the mind of man which the Deity looks through,—sees the motives which operate there, and bends the events of nature so far to control the actions resulting from them, as to make even evil intentions conducive to some good end. It is an earthly and a human notion which figures to itself the Deity arranging the affairs of the world by patching here, and mending there, as if any event could take the Creator by surprise. And here arises the question which has been repeated through all ages, “Why, then, is there evil? Why is there suffering in the world?” for if an all-powerful Deity sees and permits, it is equivalent to the causing it. Even in human law, the man who stands by and sees a murder committed, without endeavoring to prevent it, is held a party to the crime.

The answer to this is to be found in the nature of the beings in question. There is one thing which even to the Deity is impossible. The self-existent cannot make another self-existent, and what is not self-existent is bounded; for there is an antecedent and a greater power: and what is bounded is imperfect; for there is something which it does not know, and therefore it can commit errors. Now experience shows us that there is no happiness but in voluntary action: minerals have chemical affinities

and combine necessarily, but there is no sensation of pleasure; the heart performs its functions involuntarily, and there is no sensation of pleasure in their performance; the goods of life as they are called, such as health, riches, &c., when in quiet possession, give no pleasure further than they afford the means of seeking it, which is voluntary action. To make a being capable of a high degree of happiness then, he must have a free and intelligent will; and thus he is akin to the Deity, and capable of tasting the same felicity. This necessarily imperfect being, therefore, has a complete freedom of choice, consequently the power of erring in his choice; what then would be the course pursued by unbounded benevolence to preserve him from error? Would it not hedge him round with difficulties at every step towards that wrong path; with inward discomfort, pain, and a long train of evil consequences to prevent him from pursuing it? Would it not school him, as a parent does his child, by allowing him to suffer from his thoughtlessness to make him wiser in future? An imperfect being might not know how to prize or to enjoy the Divine felicity, till taught its worth by having tried in other directions and found himself wrong. Is there then actual evil in the world if we except that of the perverse will of man? I think a short consideration will show that there is not. I think that there is no man who has attained middle age, who will not acknowledge that in the irremediable events of his life there has always been either a grief avoided, or a good to be gained, if he chose to lay hold on it. A friend, the beloved above all others, dies perhaps; is it long before we can see cause to thank heaven that he is safe from the evil which he would otherwise have had to endure from evil men? His death

has changed all our views and aims ;—do we not find that in this change of views and aims we have gained more than an equivalent for what we have, after all, lost but for a time? We have gained probably a farther power of doing good ; have formed fresh connections over whom we may exercise a beneficial influence ; are becoming more capable of intellectual happiness ourselves, and of leading others to enjoy it ; more assimilated to God, and more fitted for a joyful reunion with those whom He has taken to Himself. If our conclusion as to the real nature of man be just, (and I know not how we are to avoid acknowledging it to be so), then what passes in the short span of bodily existence is but one part of a great whole ; and in passing through that state which is the school of our intellectual nature, enjoying pleasure while pursuing the right course, and suffering pain when following the wrong one, we are only undergoing a necessary preparation for a higher degree of happiness ; after which, having gained the experience necessary to enable us to choose aright, we may find in the bosom of the Divinity and in the society of others perfected like ourselves, the entire felicity which we have sighed for.

Thus far philosophy speaks. Christianity goes further, though in the same tone. Christianity says, “ Man’s path, even though thus fenced, may be mistaken,” and it proceeds to offer a set of precepts which make that path still plainer ; it offers more yet, it sets before him an exemplar of human virtue, made perfect by the indwelling of the Deity, and by showing how lovely such a life might be, even with no circumstance of worldly grandeur or pleasure to recommend it, has brought every feeling of man’s heart into accord with his true interests. “ Never

man spake like this man," "All were astonished at the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth," &c., &c., sufficiently shows how that bright pattern of excellence laid hold on the minds of the most indifferent.

Nor is this all: we have already seen that the qualities of the Divine nature may be argued out by a sound philosophy. Man finds himself in a certain degree a partaker of that nature, therefore, by the necessary law of all existence, his happiness must be of the same kind; and to seek any other would be but the insanity of a man who should plunge into the arctic seas to follow the whale. If, then, convinced of this truth, he schools his mind to wish what the Deity wills; to seek, in short, the same felicity, he will no longer have to complain of his finite nature; for Infinite Power is already accomplishing his wish, almost before he has known how to shape it. He has no dread that the attainment of his object will be defeated; for he knows that if the scheme he has devised prove vain, it is only because it was not in reality calculated to promote the end he had in view, and his inmost heart thus becomes a spring of never-failing content and satisfaction, a well of living water, freshening and beautifying all around as well as all within.

None who have not tried, are aware of the large influence which a soul thus constituted has, even upon the bodily health, though physicians have not unfrequently observed that a quiet and happy mind is the best medicine in illness. Sickness is one of those evils which are thought the immediate infliction of the Deity, though were the matter better considered, it would appear that it is most generally of man's making; but even when thus produced, it may become a blessing instead of a misfortune, by

steadily pursuing the same course. If in health, we can imitate the perfections and seek the felicity of the Deity, by diffusing happiness around us, and enjoying the contemplation of it; in sickness we may seek the knowledge which forms another part of His attributes. It is a false notion that application of the mind to science is impossible or hurtful, in such a state; on the contrary, it takes off the tedium of confinement, withdraws the attention from pain, and makes what would otherwise be wearisome, a source of enjoyment; for those who have active duties to fulfill, often have scanty leisure for acquiring what nevertheless they sigh for. In the quiet of a sick chamber knowledge may be sought and yet no duty neglected; and with convalescence comes the additional pleasure of feeling that we go forth to our duties with a mind strengthened by its high contemplations, and with increased powers of usefulness from the acquisition of knowledge. This is no imaginary picture; if the philosophy which the writer now presents to those who, like him, need it for practical use, be worth anything, let him who profits by it remember that it was so acquired. It was during months of illness that he stole time to hold intercourse with the master-minds of antiquity; and often has he hailed, almost with delight, the respite thus afforded him from worldly toil. If then, to an individual deeply involved in all the perplexities caused by man's perverse will, the mere schooling his wishes to the Divine similitude be productive of so much peace and happiness, what would be the consequence if a whole community were under the same influence? The question of "why evil is in the world?" would not then be asked; for there would be none. Health would not be worn out by extreme labor; for who that loved his neigh-

bor would require or allow it? Hearts would not be broken by unkindness; for the follower of such a system "loves his brother." Disease would not be brought on by excess, or transmitted in the blood to an unfortunate progeny; for men would no longer debase themselves by sensuality. Science would meet and control the dangers arising from natural causes; and death itself would be but a pleasant journey to a happier land, where friends and kindred were awaiting us. Again I repeat that the mass of suffering which man sternly mounts upon to arraign the Deity, is heaped up by himself only, and might be swept away again by the same hands that placed it there. Three generations of a wise and virtuous race would nearly efface the mischiefs of all the ages of sin and sorrow which had preceded them. There is nothing in all this, probably, that has not been said before, and perhaps better said; but unfortunately, the necessity of using words as the medium of thought frequently leads us to forget that they are only the medium and not the ideas themselves. Thus we find it daily repeated, that God is eternal, self-existent, almighty; and when these words are uttered it is thought sufficient. Among those who utter them, who is there who has accurately weighed the necessary conditions of such an existence? The most contradictory propositions are brought forward and insisted on, and none perceive the contradiction unless the very word should bear it upon its face. Thus, he who should assert that God is wise and ignorant, powerful and weak, at the same time, might be doubted; but he who asserts such changes of purpose in the Deity as we find resulting from the want of power or of knowledge in man, gains credit, because it is not perceived that omnipotence and omniscience leave no room for any such change,

and that eternity and self-existence entirely forbid the possibility of it: this is but one of the many propositions of this kind which daily pass current in the world. If, therefore, an accurate notion of the nature of the ruling power on whom we depend be requisite to the understanding our position, and regulating our actions, it is of no small importance to awaken men's minds to the logical consequences of their admitted creed. Indeed, were this course generally followed, there would be an end of the dissensions which now disgrace the Christian world; for a really false opinion would soon manifest itself to the mind of the inquirer by the absurdity of its consequences, and all other differences,—which arise merely from taking words for ideas and then imagining that our neighbor means differently, because he uses a different word,—would merge in the one truth which all love, and either seek, or think they have attained. I believe that if each of the words which have in turn been made the "Shibboleth" of a party, had been subjected to such a process, we might now be living in peace, "one fold, under one shepherd." Sure I am, that as the **THE TRUTH** can be but **ONE**, there must be a fault in the course pursued, or those who have honestly sought it could not have remained, as,—alas for Christian charity!—many wise, and otherwise good men have remained,—in bitter opposition to each other.

"The man is other and better than his belief," says Coleridge; so deep a thinker ought to have gone further, and told us why it is so; for the maxim is a true one. Is it not that the conviction of the heart, from which his actions flow, finds imperfect expression in words, and that even those words fail to convey to others the meaning he has intended to give them? His words are attacked, and he defends

them as the visible signs of what he thinks and feels; but are they so? Let any man try to express his own interior conviction in accurate terms, and see how many deep feelings of unseen realities, how many humble prostrations of human weakness before Divine perfection, are unsusceptible of any expression at all; and when he begins to attempt a definition, how his very soul groans over the unsuited tools he has to use; and when he has felt all this, let him, if he can, condemn his neighbor's creed, when he sees his neighbor's life, and reads in that what he must have intended to express.

We have now seen what are the necessary conditions of self-existence. Will either Unitarians or Trinitarians dissent from this? Athanasius, the most decided of Trinitarians, expressed himself in nearly the same terms that I have used. Priestly could hardly have wished for any other definition. Why then have they been considered of different sects? Because each has attacked or defended *words*; and the *things* which those words were intended to convey a notion of, have not been duly considered; and then, when controversy once begins, and passion enters where placid reasoning alone should find place, adieu to the hope of brotherly fellowship! Evil feelings are engendered; the church of Christ is split; and he who endeavors to make peace by showing each party that in the heat of dispute both have gone too far, is looked upon as lukewarm in the cause, or perhaps as a traitor to that very faith which he is endeavoring to preserve "in the bond of unity."

The tradition of the church tells us that when the apostle John, sinking under the pressure of years and infirmity, could no longer preach to his converts, he was wont to be carried in a chair into the midst of them, where he pronounced simply these words,

“ Children, love one another.” If this was the last lesson of the disciple “ whom Jesus loved,” of one who had heard the gracious words of Him who “ spake as never man spake,” surely we shall do well to remember that “ brotherly love” is orthodoxy, and that charitable indulgence, not unmeasured zeal, is “ the fulfilling of the law.”

PSYCHOLOGY.

If Theology has been embarrassed by inadequate conceptions of the nature of the Self-Existent, Psychology has suffered no less from confined notions of the nature of man. Though it has been very generally believed that this nature is compound, and though the words "soul" and "body" are in every one's mouth, yet we find no distinct ideas respecting the functions of each, even among those who are the most decided in their assertion that such are the component parts of man. We find no great laws established by experimental proof, as in other sciences; no accurate classification; and he who, without a previously formed theory of his own to guide him through the labyrinth, should take up any of the works professedly written to explain the subject, would very probably find himself more bewildered when he had finished than when he began.

When a science is in this state of chaotic disorder, there is no chance of progress; the very first step towards its advancement, therefore, must be a classification which may at least reduce the subjects it embraces to something like arrangement. It may be imperfect, it may even be erroneous; but at any rate, the objects requiring attention will have been disentangled from each other, and so placed that they may be viewed separately, and examined on all sides; it is easy then to shift their position if, after such examination, it should appear necessary.

But the very thing which makes classification needful makes it also difficult. Whoever may attempt it will be met by his cotemporaries with the taunt, "What new sense has been given to you, that you imagine yourself able to do what abler minds have not accomplished?" Those who think that the adytum of the temple ought to be dark, or lighted only by the torch of the mystagogue for the entrance of the initiated, will denounce the endeavor to admit daylight as a sacrilege. What have the *people* to do in such matters? and what can a Pariah know of them? All this and more must be expected, but it alters not the case; a first step must be made, or a second never can be: and if the people, the multitude, the *οι πολλοι* (I care not by what term of contempt I and my compeers may be denominated), if the masses, I say, are to be what God made them to be, something more must be done than to tell them that they have instinctive feelings given them by a benevolent Deity, which it is a sin to indulge; for which reason severe laws abridge their gratification as far as possible: and that they have a soul destined for an immortality of spiritual enjoyment which they have no means given them of preparing for. Something more than this, I repeat, is needful to make us fit denizens of heaven: we must know how much of what we now feel is to go with us beyond the grave, how far it is to be controlled; how far indulged. We must, in short, ascertain the boundary line between the animal and the immortal nature; and this must be done, not for the *few* who have grown pale over their midnight studies, but for the *many*; for those who can only snatch a moment from the labors of the day for a short book, and whose toil has made them sleep too

soundly at night to allow of long speculations. The philosophy of the multitude must be as brief as it is practical.

We began with a slight classification of the phenomena of man's nature into

1. The instinctive emotions and appetites.
2. The faculties.
3. The will.

And I assumed that as the first two partook of the changes which the body undergoes, they were bodily; but that as the individual and intelligent will partakes of none of these changes, it was of a different nature. Had we never heard of soul and body, so marked a distinction in phenomena would have led us to look for a double principle to cause it; and I therefore propose to reduce man's nature to its ultimate elements, by arranging the whole under two simple divisions.

I. Material and animal functions subjected to bodily change, and subdivided into

1. Appetites.
2. Instinctive emotions.
3. Faculties.

II. Spiritual and unchanging functions.

The latter division only, is, strictly speaking, the province of Psychology: but in a nature so intimately blended, the one part so influences the other, that a system which should leave out either would be very imperfect. I therefore proceed to consider,

I. Material and animal functions subjected to bodily change.

1. I need not waste time in proving that appetites, such as hunger and the like, are a part of our bodily and animal nature. No one denies it; and whoever should doubt it might soon be convinced by trying

the experiment of preventing their gratification. Man would perish from the earth under such a regimen.

2. There has been more doubt as to what I here call the instinctive emotions: anger, fear, and many other emotions of this kind, have generally been termed passions, and referred to the soul for their origin; but when it is considered that they arise involuntarily in the first instance, and are attended with such a change in the circulation, and other bodily functions, as to disorder the health, and even in some instances to cause instant death, and when, moreover, it is considered that these so called passions are requisite to the preservation and well-being of the species,—for anger impels us to self-defence, fear to the avoidance of danger, &c.,—we shall be justified, I think, in giving them the appellation I have done; since, though passion, if we take it in the strict sense, means only a thing suffered *passively*; yet in common parlance it has been strangely confounded in its meaning, and is not unfrequently so used as to signify a thing done *actively*. Of course from this class of instinctive emotions must be rejected, some of the feelings hitherto classed among passions, such as Hope, which is attended with no bodily disorder, and has therefore no claim to the title of passion, or a thing suffered. It will not be necessary to specify every one of the emotions thus to be classed; it is so easy to examine whether any bodily disorder is ever occasioned by it, or not, that none can be at a loss in determining the question.

3. The faculties have been variously considered by different writers: but as a recapitulation of their opinions would take much space, those who wish to know what they are, must consult their works.

Pursuing the inquiry on the same ground that I have taken with respect to the instinctive emotions, I find clear indications of bodily origin, in the fatigue occasioned to the brain by their exercise, the necessity for repose ere they can again be set to work, their complete derangement by bodily disease, their debility in the last decrepitude of age. We need hardly ask the physiologist for his assistance here; common observation suffices for this conclusion. And here we may notice, that as the instinctive emotions are requisite for the preservation of the animal, so also are the faculties in a certain degree; for though the combinations effected in the brain may be applied to other purposes, which I shall presently speak of, yet the first and most obvious use is in the ministering to bodily needs;—contrivances for defence, for shelter, for procuring food, are the result of such combinations; and unarmed with natural covering or natural weapons as man is, it is evident that without these contrivances the species would soon perish. Thus far therefore we have a mere animal, with the properties and capacities requisite for his preservation.

II. Spiritual or unchanging functions.

These appear to be two: *i. e.*, the intelligent will, and that species of memory which forms the consciousness of identity; and which,—however ordinary recollections may be impaired by the injury or disease of the brain,—never suffers any change from infancy to death, and even in sleep remains unaltered.

We have as yet considered man as an animal only, and have seen all parts of his frame acting harmoniously together; the appetites, and the involuntary or instinctive emotions by turns stimulating the faculties to provide for the needs of the body, these facul-

ties being operations of the brain, and therefore coming within reach of the mechanical action of the system. But another power now enters upon the scene, and, for good or for evil, not unfrequently thwarts and disorders the whole. The instinctive emotions, which in themselves are evanescent, are wrought up by this untiring energy into permanent affections. The faculties which naturally only act under the stimulus of bodily wants,—that is to say, under the impulses mechanically conveyed to the brain,—are now seized upon by this restless inquisitive power, and compelled, in spite of fatigue, and even utter derangement of health in consequence, to minister to its requisitions, and supply it with the information it wants; untired, unchanging, it drags on its weary slave with immitigable determination; till at last it scornfully casts it into the grave as no longer fit for its purpose, and asks for other worlds, and ages yet to come, to satisfy its impatient longings for wisdom or for enjoyment. But though, when speaking of functions, I have divided them into two, as manifesting themselves differently; it is clear that they proceed from one principle; it is the conscious individual essence which pours itself forth in this energetic and unwearied activity, and is able, when it knows its powers, to appropriate to its own purposes the whole of the unrivaled machinery placed within its reach.

But though this nice mechanism be capable of responding to the touch of that power within, which makes man so godlike when his nature has its full play; it is too frequently left at the mercy of outward impressions, and remains the mere animal to the last: for we have already seen that the exertion of the intelligent will over the bodily functions is not requisite to their performance so as to preserve life.

Man may exist as an animal, or at least very little removed from that state, and when the brain has never been exercised in those nicer operations which the individual essence can at its choice require from it, it becomes as unfit for use as the hands of a Hindoo devotee when he has resolutely kept them shut for ten years together. Active use is the necessary condition for keeping any bodily fibre in a healthy and serviceable state; and we see that this active use is stimulated by the sensations from without, which at our first entrance into the world are so abundant in all directions. The first impulse of the child is a restless curiosity, and at the same time an endeavor to combine and arrange ideas from what he sees and hears. Sensation has done its work; the brain has perceived; the individual is beginning to discover the organ he has at his command, and he is already directing it to the inquiries needful for his information; but too frequently the child has no one who can reply to his inquiries; he gets weary of useless question, or is reproved for it; the brain consequently becomes inactive as to all its higher functions, and no farther progress is made. The will is either not exerted at all,—for the mere action of nerves of voluntary motion stimulated by sensation must not be confounded with the ruling individual will,—or if it be exerted, having no longer power over the faculties so as to acquire useful information, its whole energy is devoted to the giving force and permanence to the instinctive emotions, which being involuntary, never can slumber as the faculties are wont to do. The man becomes thus the creature of passion, and that immaterial essence which should have been the guide to all that is excellent and noble in knowledge and in feeling, panders only to the impulses of the body, and degrades

itself from its high dignity merely to sink both below the level of the brute; for the brute, when the appetite is satisfied, goes no farther; but bring the intelligent will once to aid, and the jaded appetite is pampered and stimulated; fresh excitement is sought, and the body is at last worn out by the endeavors of its unwearied ally to minister to its gratification.

In cases of idiocy it is evident that the brain never has attained a sufficient power for supplying the individual will with the information it needs; but the proverbial obstinacy of idiotic persons shows that this power is as strong in them as in others; and were a careful training given to such children, it would be found that they are capable of much more than is supposed.* I knew a family in humble life, some years ago, where three of the children were thus afflicted; two of them were trained as persons in that rank usually are, to labor, and attend the church on Sunday. The third, and youngest, was the mother's darling, and nothing was required of him. The first two remained weak in intellect, but capable of performing many manual labors; were honest and industrious in their way, and were conscientious in the discharge of their humble duties. The third was the reckless, spiteful idiot too often seen.

Again, in insanity we find a no less resolute will; but misled by the false report of the brain, it is devoted to useless or mischievous purposes; and here too it is probable, that were the office of the brain, of the instinctive emotions, and of the ruling will, duly distinguished, this most miserable of all calamities might be either wholly averted, or greatly mitigated. Its origin is either in a diseased state of the

* See "Small Books," &c., No. 3, § 14.

brain, from injury, or the violent action of some instinctive emotion, or a devotion of the cerebral power to one subject exclusively of all others, till it has no longer the power to apply to any but that. Now were the ruling will in the habit of claiming that supremacy which it *can* claim, it seems probable that in every one of these instances it might, if not prevent the evil wholly,—as it probably would in the two latter,—yet greatly mitigate it. Else how is it that we find in cases of confirmed insanity the fear of pain will curb the fit? Here the will is excited to use its power to avoid an evil, and for the time it uses it successfully.

Few know or believe the immense power which this undying energy is capable of exercising over the body, for it is only now and then that it is seen in full action; but that it is both master of, and widely different from the animal nature, may be sufficiently shown from those instances. For example, when a man resolves on putting an end to his existence by abstaining from food,—and this has been done,—the tyrannical sway exercised over every sensation and craving of the body, is complete and durable, as well as in entire contradiction to every impulse of the animal nature. Or if it be said that this has been merely the last resort of a man wearied out with suffering, let us take the case of one hazarding or throwing away his own life to save another from perishing. A stranger it may be, one from whom he has nothing to expect, and where he has no incitement but the intimate conviction that a higher and a nobler nature claims the sacrifice of the mere animal. He knows that he is rushing upon death, he feels, probably, some natural shudder in doing so; yet this is overruled, and he goes on with his resolute purpose. Take away the influence of such

a principle within, and half the actions of men are utterly unaccountable; for it is the natural tendency of all things to accomplish the end of their being; and if it be sentient, to be happy in doing so. The plant blossoms and bears fruit before it decays, and its life may be prolonged by preventing it from blossoming. The mere animal eats, drinks, propagates its species, and is satisfied; but man is always aiming at objects to which his life is frequently sacrificed, and no one calls him insane. On the contrary, in the proportion that he is ready with this sacrifice, he is honored and esteemed; because every one has an interior consciousness that it is what his own nature aspires to. He feels that he is now but the larva of himself, and that he has a higher career opening before him, where all that was beginning to develop itself will acquire perfection, where all the gentler sympathies of our nature may still find place and scope, and from whence the grosser animal gratifications alone will be banished, along with the earthly frame which required them.

PRACTICAL RESULTS.

“WHAT is a Religion?” and “what is a system of Philosophy?” They are two different answers to the questions most interesting to man. Examine all the religions which have long held sway over the minds of men, all the philosophical systems which have united under their banner a large portion of the enlightened part of mankind, and you will find that these religions and their systems have one distinction common to both; that they have boldly proposed and solved the whole of those problems. It is by this character that we recognize a really great system, and we may truly say that if one of these questions has been pretermitted, it is but half a religion or half a system of philosophy. Would you have an example of the stretch and extent of a great religion, look at Christianity! Ask a Christian “whence the human race is derived?” He can tell you.—“What is man’s object, and what his destiny?” He can tell you. Ask a poor child from school, “why he is here, and what will become of him after death?” He will make you an answer full of sublime truths, which probably he may not half understand, but which are not, therefore, the less admirable. Ask him, “How the world was created, and why?” “How the earth has been peopled? why men suffer, and how all this will end?” He can tell. He knows the duties of man towards God and towards his fellow-men, and when he is older, and has learned the system more completely, he will not hesitate at all more respecting

natural, political, and national rights; for each of these parts of knowledge flows as naturally from Christianity as light from the sun. Such is what I call a great system.

These are the words of a French philosopher who himself was not a Christian,* but I can find no words which would more aptly trace the way in which a "great system" must influence all the relations of life; and most truly does he pronounce that to be but a half doctrine which is incapable of this extended rule over men's minds and actions. When, therefore, I come to the practical result of a scheme of philosophy which walks hand in hand with the "great system" which M. Jouffroy has so well described, it will not be astonishing if I find myself obliged to touch on many points where great differences of opinion have existed. To those who may not take the same view of the subject, I can only say with Themistocles, "Strike, if you please, but hear me." Weigh at least, whether there be not some truth that deserves your farther attention in the propositions which at first may seem strange, and perhaps displeasing.

We have already considered the exterior and interior power in their separate nature and functions: we now come to the mutual relations which must subsist between them, and the influence these have on man's position, prospects, and finally destiny. We have seen man endued with instincts and facul-

* Perhaps I ought rather to say, that disgusted with the narrow views of contending sects, he was unable to find any one to which he could associate himself, and thus, unphilosophic only in this, overlooked his own proposition, that great systems, whether of philosophy or religion, are only two modes of solving the same question, not two solutions; and that, therefore, he who professes a pure and true philosophy is a Christian, whether he knows it or not.

ties purely corporeal in their origin and mode of exercise; and yet, in the midst of these corporeal instincts and faculties, we find another power introduced of a different nature, capable of diverting them from their natural course, and exercising an almost illimitable sway over them; like the musical instruments which by their regular machinery can produce a set number of tunes, but yet have keys annexed, by which a skillful player can produce harmony at his will: and this complex nature of man is the work of a Being who, having all power and all knowledge, must do what is best for the proposed end.

If we look through creation in every instance where we have an opportunity of watching the operations of *nature*, as writers on such subjects are wont to say, or as I should say, of the *Framer* of nature, we find no substance formed with particular properties for an especial occasion, which properties never come into use afterwards. Every chemist knows that each substance has its peculiar qualities and laws which avail equally be it free or in combination, be it part of an organized or an unorganized body; and that amid all the mutations which are continually going on, nothing is wasted, nothing so far changed in nature that it cannot be resolved again into its component parts, which by the same unchanging laws form fresh combinations, each nevertheless still retaining the fundamental character impressed upon it. We see too that all organized things,—I am not speaking now of man, —have exactly those qualities, organs, and impulses given them, which conduce to the end of their being; which end they scarcely ever fail to accomplish: the plant, the insect, the animal have their different modes of life and production; but they live and produce; no property inherent in them interferes to prevent this. We further see that when we have established

any great law of creation by reasonable induction, we can explain hitherto puzzling phenomena by a reference to these laws.

Upon these last grounds, then, I assume that man's instincts and faculties are given him for purposes of permanent utility extending beyond this life : because it is evident that he has a property inherent in him, which interferes with, and very frequently wholly prevents, the full development of his animal nature ; and therefore that animal nature, and the period of its duration, is not all of man. And if any one objects that man is in a fallen state, and therefore that these instincts and faculties are corrupt, and that we are not to look for good but for evil from them, I reply, that those who make this objection doubtless will allow that when man came from the hands of his Maker, his nature, as well as all the rest of the new world, was "very good." Now we have already seen that these instincts and faculties are corporeal ; provided for by a very simple and complete mechanism, but still by mechanism, as much as the bending of the joints or the growth of the body ; then these instincts and faculties were in man originally such as they now are, excepting in instances where they are impaired by disease, and are no more corrupt than his bones or his muscles ; and it is only when the individual power interferes to give intensity and duration to these animal functions, that they run into excess, and thus become an evil, from the due balance between them being overthrown. It is no small happiness to the world that those kindly feelings which bind man to man, are all found among the instinctive emotions, which being consequent on the very frame of man, and altogether involuntary in the first instance, are therefore in no danger of being ever wholly stifled ; while the sterner part of his nature

which we have called *the faculties*, result from cerebral combinations produced by a voluntary act, and therefore subsequent to the first impulse of sensation.

Let us now see how the individual is likely to be affected by this corporeal mechanism. He enters the world inexperienced and full of wonder at the scenes around him, and the first sensation that is awakened after that of mere appetite, is, love to the parent who cherishes him; the next, grief at the sight of an angry or a sad countenance. It is only gradually that the brain acquires power for its higher exercises, and long ere this has taken place, the feelings have taught the individual better than the most luminous argument could have done, that it is good to love those who are kind to us, and to avoid exciting their anger or their grief; and this is become so habitual, that a deviation from the usual course of feeling is painful in the first instance. Here then, the very first of instinctive emotions, provide a never-failing source of happy intercourse; and there is so much pleasure in yielding to them, that nothing further is requisite than a curbing power. The individual readily abandons himself to the gentle influence; but he may follow it too far. A parent or a companion may ask a wrong compliance: it is then that the intelligent will may call in the aid of the faculties to combine arguments, and weigh consequences; and, sitting like a sovereign at his council board, finally resolve, that the petitioning feeling ought not to be attended to. How soon the brain shall be capable of thus giving counsel, depends on the wholesome exercise it has had; for where no stores of knowledge have been laid up, arguments cannot be found; and where the habit has not been acquired by daily use, combinations of ideas are formed with difficulty. It would seem that mere

sensation had found itself the straightest road, and that the more complex convolutions in which, according to some, memory and the higher reasoning faculties are exercised, were so unaccustomed to be called into use, that the parts were grown stiff and inactive; nay, as we see that size and strength of limb is only gained by exercise, it is not impossible that a brain never called into use, may not even have its full proportions; and thus, from neglect in childhood, a physical incapacity may be engendered. Suppose this the case, and that either from want of exercise or of power, the faculties in their higher uses are not duly developed, it follows that the individual will, having no guide but the emotions, will follow them blindly, they themselves being but a blind impulse; and when "the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch." But this is no corruption of nature, all these functions are useful and good in themselves, it is merely a neglect of one part which throws the rest off their balance.

Let us now suppose that the faculties having been cultivated to the utmost, the will has listened to them almost exclusively: a harsh character will be engendered; for no human being is perfect, and if we bestow our regard *only* in the ratio of specific merit, we shall seldom find enough excellence meet our notice to justify any large share of it. It is then that a yet more powerful instinct steps in: love between the sexes teaches at once the generous self-devotion which the combinations of rational argument might have been long in inculcating, and perhaps have attempted ineffectually; and all the gentler social relations arise out of it to sweeten life, and give a yet higher scope to our wishes; for who that truly loves will be satisfied that the union shall be broken at the gates of the grave, which has been so sweet

an one through life? And how often do we see that he who cared not if his loose companions looked upon his vices, has shrunk from, and perhaps quitted them, when he thought of the innocent child whom he could not bear to contaminate! And thus we see two kinds of animal functions mutually balancing each other, uniting to school the individual will to all that is amiable and exalted. The instinctive emotions softening the sternness of the faculties, the faculties curbing the animal force of the emotions, and the will, impelled by the solicitations of the one, and guided by the information and caution of the other, acquiring by degrees those habits of judging and feeling rightly, which qualify man for the spiritual felicity of his Creator. He has learned the enjoyment of benevolence and the excellence of knowledge, and his heaven is already begun on this side the tomb; and thus, though these emotions and these faculties may cease with the bodily mechanism which causes them, they have stamped their impress on the individual. Like metal poured from the furnace into a mould, which retains for ever the form so acquired, though the mould be but of earth; the will has acquired the character it will carry with it into eternity, though the mould in which it was cast be returned to its dust.

Can the Christian who holds philosophy to be "foolishness," deny that these warm though instinctive emotions, these aspiring faculties, are in exact conformity with the rule he acknowledges? The God who made man was not so limited in power or knowledge, or so wanting in benevolence, as to have given him properties unfitted for the fulfilment of his high destiny. The Saviour himself has pronounced that a man shall leave all else to "cleave to his wife." He has given as the badge of his

followers, that they should "love one another;"—as the rule of our life, that we should strive to be "perfect, as our Father in heaven is perfect." We look into our hearts, and we find that we are naturally led to love the woman of our choice, beyond all other things; that we cannot be happy, or even retain a sane mind and healthy body without social intercourse, and that we aspire to knowledge, to greatness, to immortality, to perfection in short, with a longing that is never satisfied in this life, yet never wholly subdued. Is that philosophy *foolishness*, which by rational argument deduces the truths of the Gospel from the very nature of things, and thus leaves no room for hesitation or disbelief?

But if this be the case—if a due balance of instincts and faculties be needful to school the Will, so as to fit it for the only felicity suited to its nature—what sort of training ought man to have, and what must be the sensations of one who feels this truth deeply, when he looks round on the habits and maxims of society, and the principles on which legislation is too generally founded? "The poor man must learn to restrain his passions," say political economists;—let them first define what passion means. It is convenient when an ambiguous term hides instead of explaining the intention; and this well-sounding term means, that, because it suits those who have the power, to retain the soil as their own property, therefore the man who is debarred from any share of it, is to be debarred also from the due perfection of his nature. Those very instincts given to mould it to benevolence and kindness are to be rooted out; or, if God be stronger than man, and this endeavor fail, they are to be made instruments of evil instead of good, and what would have been the parent of all the lovely social affections, is

to become the mere appetite of the brute, indulged when the animal nature is importunate, but so indulged as to degrade and deteriorate, instead of improving the individual.

“We must have servants and laborers, hewers of wood and drawers of water,” say the rich and the luxurious; “it is therefore idle to teach the poor what will only set them above their work.” I only ask, does it so really? Where are the instances of the real lover of intellectual improvement, who has been inefficient in what he has undertaken? But suppose it were as is objected,—suppose a few hours were lost, or a few shillings spent on intellectual pleasures—do we never see either one or the other wasted at the beer house? And which is the better way of spending them? But setting aside all this, setting aside,—what I have always found,—that mental cultivation strengthens our power for whatever we undertake; I ask again, what right have you to cramp and stifle the intellectual faculties of a large portion of your fellow creatures, in order that you may purchase their bodily labor, even supposing that you could no otherwise secure it?—to rob men of the best gift God has given them, in order that you may “fare sumptuously every day, and “be clothed in purple and fine linen.” The mutes of the seraglio were deprived of the power of speech, that they might not tell the secrets of their master. Would you condemn as cruelty the depriving a child of one bodily organ, and yet justify the cramping the whole system of mental powers, merely that there may be a Pariah caste—a Helot race,—who shall never rise above the soil they tread on, and look up to their masters as to beings of another species? If such were to be the enduring state of society,

there would be some justification for those who might strive to overturn all existing institutions, in the hope that human nature would find means to assert its rights in the confusion. Such are not the lessons of the Gospel, for "there is no respect of person" before God, and yet probably never till now, and in this so called free land of England, was the distinction of rank made to press so heavily on the poor man. The slave in Greece and Rome was in some things better off. He was instructed that he might be serviceable; and finished, not unfrequently, by being the friend and companion of his master as his freed man. The mistress and her female slave sate and span together. In the modern states of continental Europe even, the servant or the laborer enjoys a certain degree of familiarity; and is in consequence more contented, though poorer. The increase of riches and refinement in England has given the upper classes a character of their own;—with a selfish exclusiveness, they wish to retain this distinction; and with an instinctive feeling that intellectual strength is power, however the maxim may have been hackneyed and ridiculed, they hide from their own hearts even, the uneasy dread of being encroached on, under the specious argument that for the poor man his Bible suffices. A blessed and cheering book it is doubtless; but how much richer a harvest of useful precept does it afford to those whose minds have been enlarged by further culture; how many mistakes would be avoided if the great principles of Philosophy were better studied; how much light would be thrown on it if something were known of the times, the places where, and the people to whom its words were spoken. The Bible alone is not enough; the mind requires relaxation: the commonest events of Eng-

land raise curiosity respecting other lands and habits of life; and the young who hear a sailor narrating the wonders of his voyages, or the soldier of his campaigns, naturally wish to know something about the things they hear of. Why is innocent pleasure to be denied them? We should have a more moral population if amusements of a higher and more intellectual character were placed within their reach. It is not enough to give them food and raiment merely, they feel the wish to be respected as men.

Let me not be misunderstood. I call for no agrarian law, no equality, which if established to-day, must cease to-morrow, from the very difference of individual strength and inclination; but I call for justice;—I call upon legislators to remember what God remembers, *i. e.*, “whereof we are made.” I call upon them not to damn their immortal fellow-men, by curbing with all the force of stringent laws on the one hand, and cold neglect on the other, the development of a nature which God looked upon when he had made it, and lo, “it was very good.” Interested men have parted what ought to have been joined. Philosophy and Christianity have been severed, and both have been made to speak a language foreign to their purpose; but though man for a time may obscure those eternal verities, it is but like the smoke which hides the sun; the light must break forth again; and let us thank God that it must.

It may be asked what I would substitute for the order of things I complain of? This is the ready way of getting rid of disagreeable representations, yet I will not shrink from this either; but the subject is large enough to require to be treated separately, and my business here is with the establishment of great principles; these once established,

details spring naturally from them. I return therefore for the present to man and his nature, position, prospects, and final destiny.

I have assumed, upon what I think sufficient ground, that all the phenomena of our nature are to be referred to animal appetite, instinctive emotions, faculties, and intelligent will, coupled with that memory which constitutes the perception of identity; and I have assumed farther, that the last class of phenomena only, can be considered as properly belonging to the operations of the soul. I have also stated that an essential part of the great Self-Existent Cause of all things is a free and governing Will. Man therefore in this bears the image of his Maker; and inasmuch as he partakes in a certain degree of the nature of his Creator, his happiness and his destiny must be of a kind somewhat analogous.

The felicity of the Creator, as far as we can judge, must consist in the constant harmony of his nature with his acts: in the will to do what is best, and the power to effect it; or, in other words, in unbounded knowledge, power, and benevolence. Now, though man's finite nature can follow but at humble distance, it *can* follow. He may act in conformity to his nature; he may delight in conferring happiness, and in seeking knowledge: and I believe all who have tried the experiment will bear testimony that this course confers, even in this life, a peace of mind, a joy even in the midst of the turmoils of the world, which is more akin to heaven than earth.

Christianity teaches this, but in a simpler manner, by precept without argument; and it might therefore seem at first sight that the argument was superfluous: but it is not; for those who attend only to the precept are apt to consider the command to "love our neighbor,"—to "be conformed to Christ,"

—to “be perfect as our Father which is in heaven is perfect,”—and the announcement of the misery that would attend the neglect of these commands,—as *merely arbitrary laws*, established by the Creator for reasons known only to himself; and He is thus made to appear as a despotic sovereign, to be feared because he has power to punish the infraction of his laws, rather than as an object of grateful and affectionate adoration, no less for the good he has given, than for what he has promised. Take the argument with the precept—show that it is in the nature of things that whatever felicity an intellectual being is capable of, must be akin to that enjoyed by the Deity; and that therefore if we seek happiness in any other direction, we shall necessarily fail of our object—and we immediately see the fatherly kindness of the command; and the very announcement that any other course would be attended with perdurable misery, instead of appearing in the light of a vindictive denunciation of punishment shows itself to be what it really is—the caution of an affectionate and anxious parent, who

“metuensque moneret

Acres esse viros, cum dura praelia gente;”

and does not send forth his child to the combat till he has given him every counsel, and provided him with every defence which the fondest concern could dictate.

This is not, I am aware, the most usual mode of viewing the subject, and it is perhaps because it is not, that our religion is frequently cold and unprofitable. If the conforming our will to the will of the Deity, or, in other words, the finding our pleasure in the same objects, be requisite to our happiness, it is clear that *fear* will be a very ineffectual agent

in the business. We may choose a certain course of action because we dread the punishment consequent on the contrary course, but we shall not do so because it is a *pleasure* to us. Even the most unphilosophical religious teacher will allow that this is not the state of mind which the true Christian should aim at, for, says St. John, "Perfect love casteth out fear;" and nothing can be juster than the distinction made by the late Alexander Knox, between the imperfect Christian who *fears*, and the perfect one who *loves*; for as the doing an act under the dread of punishment is but a yielding of the will to one of the least exalted of the animal emotions, so it tends very little, if at all, to the amelioration of the character. The evil actions which might engender evil habits have been avoided, but we have accustomed ourselves to be actuated by a cowardly motive which a great mind ought to despise, and a Christian to eschew. Added to all this, the emotion which is the foundation of this kind of virtue is of a painful nature, and therefore another instinctive emotion,—that of shrinking from present suffering,—very quickly counteracts it; for in proportion as the fear is great, will be the effort of nature to allay or stifle it; thus the small influence it exercises over the will is transitory also.

It is no new discovery of mine that we must do what we like, or, in other words, like what we do, in order to be happy. All men know and act upon this principle; can we suppose it unknown to Him who made us? and can we suppose also, that knowing the conformity of our will to His to be our happiness, He would take by preference so inadequate an agent as fear, to lead us to identify ourselves with Him? for this identity of will with the Deity, it cannot be too often repeated, is the sum and sub-

stance of religion as well as of philosophy. We are to become, as it were, a part of the Divine essence; his *children*; one in our interests, our affections, our designs: and thus identified with the Father of our love, we have his wisdom for our guide, his power to effect our utmost desires. A religion made up of terrors offers no attraction; we only half believe it, for it is repugnant to all our rational and instinctive feelings; it is unlovely; we cannot cherish it in our hearts as the source of happiness, or keep it beside us in our lighter hours as our companion and guide. On the contrary, the philosophic view being in itself pleasant, never seems importunate or misplaced: it lays hold on our feelings, and dwells with them till it becomes a constant principle of action. It is rational and satisfies the intellect; and the will thus learning to love what is both agreeable and wise, all inclination to any other course disappears. We feel that by pursuing a different one we should be unhappy; for it is not till we have depraved our nature that we make even a step in the wrong path without pain, and what at first was weighed and judged fitting, becomes at last so habitual, that we may act almost without reflection, and act right.

There is always one great obstacle to the reception of the simple religion or philosophy (for I know no difference between them) taught by Christ during his ministry on earth; it is its *very simplicity*. It is hard to persuade men that it is not some "great thing" that is required of them; like Naaman, who despised the order to "wash and be clean" of his leprosy. Yet it is this simplicity, this conformity to common sense and common feeling, which proves its divinity the most decidedly; for the law, and the nature to be governed by that law, have evidently

been the work of the same hand. "Est enim virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura,"* said the Roman philosopher long ago, and it is a truth well worth remembering. The same objection that is now made to the rational views of Christianity, viz., that it makes its professors men of this world, was made to its first great teacher; "Behold a glutton and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners." Yet when the Saviour thought it not beneath him to sit at the table of Zaccheus at what we should now call a large dinner party, it is evident that no sour restraints are imposed on the Christian, even if we have never heard of any rule of life but the following His steps who was sent to be an example for us. The Saviour did not sit at that table in vain; we hear of no severe reproofs; no stern lecture; but he who knew well what man's affections could do, won the heart of Zaccheus. "The half of my goods I give to the poor, and if I have done any wrong to any man, I restore him fourfold," was the resolution taken by the giver of the feast at that dinner; and it is thus that the servant of Christ, the philosopher in the true sense of the word—for what is love of wisdom but love of the wisdom or σοφία of God?—it is thus, I say, that the servant of Christ may move in the world, blessing and blessed. Polished, eloquent, dignified, Christ exhibited, amid the world which he did not fly from, a pattern of everything that was attractive in man. So may, and so should the Christian; and thus sanctify and purify society by his presence and example, till the precepts of our great Master become its precepts also; till forgiveness of injuries and purity of life be thought as

* "Virtue is nothing but the utmost perfection of our nature."

necessary to the character of a gentleman, as truth is even now; till amusements and business, trade and politics, shall alike own the healing influence, and "the kingdoms of the world" become what,— notwithstanding the boastful title of Christendom,*— they never have been yet, "the kingdoms of God and of his Christ."

It was the pure philosophy of Christianity, its exact accordance with every want and wish of our nature, that spread the doctrine of the poor fishermen of Galilee through the palaces and the schools, no less than the shops and the farms, of Greece and Rome. It has now ceased to spread, and why? Is it not because its Philosophy is forgotten? Is it not that by being made to consist in a certain set of mysterious dogmata which it is almost forbidden to examine, it is put on a level with those false systems which shrink from the light, because they know they will suffer from being seen when exposed to it? It was not thus that Christianity was *first* preached to the world. Its teachers and its martyrs appealed to its rationality, to its accordance with the highest conceptions of the wisest and the best of the Grecian sages. They contrasted its purity with the abominations of Paganism; the brotherly love of its followers, with the ferocity, treachery and hatred of the rest of the world; they showed that there must be a God, and that He could be no other than they described. The Eternal God, said they, must be essentially rational. Exerted or not, the wisdom to know, and the power to act must be co-eternal in him. We do not worship two Gods, as you object to us; the *λογος* (rational faculty) of God, animated a human form, and spoke to us through human lips, "God was in Christ reconciling

* The domain of Christ.

the world to himself," and him we worship. We do not say that our God suffered or died. The body which he wore as a raiment was sacrificed, but God is impassible, ONE SELF-EXISTENT ETERNAL MIND.* It was thus that the early apologists for Christianity explained its tenets to the Pagan world; and the Pagan world received them. What have we gained by abandoning the philosophy of these Martyrs of the truth? We have abundance of technical terms; but have we the *Spirit* of the Gospel? Do we bear the badge of Christ, "hereby shall men know that ye are my disciples, that ye love one another?" If we do not—if rich and poor, Dissenter and Churchman, Romanist and Socinian, are, as it were, separate classes that hold no fellowship together—then is our Christianity as faulty as our philosophy—we have "the *form* of Godliness," but not "the *power* thereof," and however we may boast "the temple of the Lord" (and, blessed be God, it does yet afford shelter to some whom their Lord at his coming will own as his true disciples), we may find at last that phrases are of less importance than motives; and see,—Heaven grant that it may not be too late!—that "God is no respecter of persons," but that "in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him."

*Vide Tertullian, Athenagoras, Arnobius, &c. &c.



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
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
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